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INTRODUCTION:
Although the average U.S. consumer may be unfamiliar with the
Jones Act1— a century old U.S. maritime cabotage law—one has most
likely been burdened by the law’s associated costs, which are estimated to
be $1.32 billion annually.2 The law’s blatant protectionist scheme
continues to throttle domestic port-to-port maritime trade, and has
inhibited the U.S. maritime industry to a point where U.S. flag-bearing
ships can no longer compete in the international market.3 But worse,
adverse effects of the law have now invaded other U.S. industries, notably
choking the energy market, as the Jones Act continues to prevent effective
transportation of new forms of natural resources being produced
domestically.4 The Jones Act is now in dire need of reevaluation, as it no
longer serves its intended purpose, constrains economic growth in key
sectors of the domestic marketplace, and continues to adversely impact
U.S. consumers.
Formally, the Jones Act—which is named after its author, Senator
Wesley L. Jones—is codified in Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act
of 1920,5 and “has long been regarded as [the] cornerstone of U.S.
maritime policy.”6 More specifically, the Jones Act is the pinnacle of the
U.S.’s broader scheme of “cabotage regulations,” which “are not unique
to the maritime industry,” but just refers to “coastwise [or coastal]”
transportation of goods and merchandise.7 So, maritime cabotage
regulations are the surrounding laws that govern domestic, port-to-port
1
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. § 55102 (2012) (formerly cited as 46 App.
U.S.C. §§ 861–889 (2002)) (commonly referred to as “the Jones Act”).
2
U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT RESTRAINTS 122
(2d Ed., 1999).
3
See infra Part III.A.2.
4
See James Coleman, Repeal the Jones Act for American Energy, REGULATORY
TRANSPARENCY PROJECT 1, 3 (Sep. 28, 2017), https://regproject.org/paper/repeal-jones-act-americanenergy/.
5
Note that Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, which “governs claims made
by seaman for personal injuries suffered in the course of their employment,” is also sometimes referred
to as “the Jones Act,” but the only focus of this paper is Section 27 (as codified in 46 U.S.C. § 55102),
which will be referred to throughout as “the Jones Act.” See Constantine G. Papavizas & Bryant E.
Gardner, Is the Jones Act Redundant?, 21 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 95, 96–97 (2009).
6
John F. Frittelli, The Jones Act: An Overview, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 1
(July 8, 2003), https://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS21566.
7
Id. at 1–2; see also Wakil O. Oyedemi, Cabotage Regulations and the Challenges of
Outer Continental Shelf Development in the United States, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 607, 611 (2012)
(“cabotage regimes are laws regulating the transportation of persons and merchandise from one point
to another along the coastal waters of a nation”).
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trading in the U.S. The Jones Act operates similarly to most other countries
maritime cabotage laws, generally aiming to (1) create a strong merchant
marine that can quickly mobilize in times of national emergency and (2)
“protect American sovereignty over domestic maritime commerce.”8
Specifically, Section 1 of the statute states that:
It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth
of its foreign and domestic commerce that the United States shall have a
merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval
or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to
be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States; and it is
declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever may be
necessary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant
marine, and, in so far as may not be inconsistent with the express
provisions of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall [. . .] keep
always in view this purpose and object as the primary end to be attained.9
In order to ensure that this purpose is met, the Jones Act sets forth
stringent requirements for ships that want to operate on U.S. domestic
port-to-port routes, requiring that: “[A]ll waterborne shipping between
points within the United State [must] be carried by vessels built in the
United States, [be] owned by a U.S. citizen (at least 75%), and [be]
manned with U.S. citizen crews.”10 Thus, on a broader scale, the Jones Act
protects the U.S. industry from foreign competitors, ultimately aiming to
create a strong maritime industry that cannot easily be undercut. But,
conflicting interests and changing economic landscape have brought the
Jones Act under fire, as the Act struggles to continue serving its intended
purpose and unintended consequences of the Act become more prevalent.
The Jones Act’s recent return to prominence in the wake of
Hurricane Maria provides an excellent illustration of just how outdated the
law is, reviving heated debate amongst economic experts and lawmakers
alike on the statute’s relevance and applicability in modern times.11 As
“the fulcrum of the cabotage regulation in the United States [inclusive of
the non-contiguous U.S. states and territories],”12 the Jones Act’s stringent
domestic shipping requirements became the center-point of discussion in
Maria’s aftermath, hindering the Trump administration’s ability to quickly

8

Frittelli, supra note 6, at 2–3.
46 App. U.S.C. § 861 (2002) (emphasis added).
10
Frittelli, supra note 6, at 1.
11
See Niraj Chokshi, Trump Waives Jones Act for Puerto Rico, Easing Hurricane Aid
Shipments, N.Y. TIMES ¶ 14–15 (Sep. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/jones-actwaived.html.
12
Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 608.
9
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respond to one of the worst natural disasters in our nation’s history.13
Ultimately, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was forced
to grant a waiver of the Jones Act,14 which allowed foreign ships a rare
opportunity to enter the U.S. domestic shipping realm to provide much
needed aid for Puerto Rico recovery efforts (albeit only for a short, 10-day
period).15 Similarly, the Jones Act was waived during Hurricane Harvey
for essentially identical reasons,16 as the U.S. lacked sufficient Jones Act
compliant ships to properly supply a devastated Houston with desperately
needed resources, such as sufficient fuel to “restore services and
infrastructure in the wake of the storm.”17 Granting Jones Act waivers to
foreign ships following natural disasters has in fact become common
practice of DHS because the U.S. merchant marine, which was supposed
to be bolstered by the Jones Act, lacks the necessary capacity and speed to
effectively respond in emergency situations.18
The irony of this illustration is hard to miss, as one of the stated
purposes of the Jones Act is to have a domestic fleet of seafaring vessels
that can offer aid and quickly respond during any “national emergency.”19
But, the DHS’s repetitive grants of Jones Act waivers during national
emergencies (e.g., natural disasters) perfectly exemplifies the law’s
ineffective and antiquated nature, succinctly showing one of the many
13
See Alana Abramson & Jennifer Calfas, What to Know About the Impact of the Jones
Act on Puerto Rico Aid, TIME ¶ 1–5 (Sep. 28, 2017), http://time.com/4961159/
what-is-jones-act-puerto-rico/; see also Amber Phillips, Trump just lifted the Jones Act for
Puerto Rico. Here’s what that does., WASH. POST ¶ 1–5 (Sep. 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/27/all-about-the-jones-act-an-obscureshipping-law-thats-stalling-puerto-ricos-recovery/?utm_term=.5610a43eb561 (showing the national
coverage on the Jones Act’s related to Hurricane Maria recovery efforts).
14
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Waiver of Compliance with Navigation Laws, Jones
Act Waiver (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/17_0928_AS1_Jones-Act-Waiver.pdf.
15
See James Coleman, Repeal the Jones Act to Speed Puerto Rico Recovery, FOX NEWS ¶
6 (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/10/11/repeal-jones-act-to-speed-puertorico-recovery.amp.html.
16
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Waiver of Compliance with Navigation Laws, Jones
Act Waiver (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/17_0908_AS1_Jones-Act-Waiver.pdf.
17
U.S. waives Jones Act to secure fuel for hurricane responders, REUTERS ¶ 5 (Sept. 8,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-irma-shipping/u-s-waives-jones-act-to-securefuel-for-hurricane-responders-idUSKCN1BJ2GE.
18
See Thomas Grennes, An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act, MERCATUS CENTER 3, 9
(2017), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-grennes-jones-act-v2.pdf.
19
46 App. U.S.C. § 861 (2002); see also Alexander Stevens, The Jones Act: Distorting
American Energy Markets Since 1920, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. ¶ 1 (Sept. 29, 2017),
https://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/jones-act-distorting-american-energy-markets-since1920/ (“[t]he temporary suspension of the legislation [following Hurricane Maria] is noteworthy
because one of the stated purposes of the Jones Act is to better prepare the country for natural
disasters”).
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reasons why the outdated law should be substantially relaxed or repealed,
especially considering the law’s permeation into other crucial areas of the
U.S. economy.
This article will explore the ramifications that the Jones Act has
on those other crucial areas of the U.S. economy, specifically looking at
the U.S. energy market and analyzing how the Jones Act’s interplay with
the domestic energy transportation market has been affected. Because of
the substantial burden the Jones Act places on the shipping of natural
resources, the U.S. energy market has been hindered, as this law continues
to adversely impact both U.S. consumers and energy industry
development in general. Given the U.S.’s renewed interest in development
of an independent energy market,20 it is time to revise or repeal the overlyrestrictive measures the Jones Act has imposed on transportation of natural
resources to help fix the outdated U.S. maritime cabotage laws and
promote necessary growth in the U.S. energy market.
Following this introduction, Part II will discuss the relevant
historical background of U.S. cabotage laws and development of the Jones
Act, considering how the domestic shipping trade developed in response
to the stringent requirements of the law. This section will help to provide
a better understanding of how stringent cabotage laws hinder domestic
commerce and the transportation of natural resources. Part III will then
discuss the current state of U.S. maritime cabotage law and the Jones Act,
considering (1) the current economic effects of the Jones Act in detail, and
(2) how the energy market currently deals with the Act. In Part IV, the
Jones Act’s substantial effects on the U.S. energy market and U.S. energy
transportation is reviewed in detail. The pros and cons of the Jones Act are
discussed in relation to all forms of transportation that the Jones Act has
inadvertently influenced, such as the market for natural resource
transportation by pipeline, airplane, and railway. Further, this section will
discuss how the Jones Act hindered development of an independent U.S.
energy market, explaining how weaknesses of the Jones Act encouraged
the entry of foreign energy competitors into the domestic market, despite
the Act’s protectionist scheme. Part V will offer reasonable alternatives as
to how the Jones Act can be brought up-to-date with the current U.S.
policy trends, such as relaxing specific provisions of the Act to promote
easier transport of domestically produced natural resources, or granting of
a perpetual waiver to foreign maritime transporters operating in the energy
industry. Finally, Part VI concludes by summarizing key points and
offering suggestions as to next steps.
20
See Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order. No. 13,783,
82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,093–94 (Mar. 31, 2017) (stating “[t]he heads of agencies shall review all
existing regulations . . . that potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced
energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources”).
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I.

HISTORY & DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. MARITIME CABOTAGE
LAWS

Maritime cabotage laws are not unique to the United States, as
nations have historically placed an extremely high value on their domestic
shipping industries.21 As Thomas Grennes recognized in his economic
analysis of the Jones Act, “Protection of domestic shipping is an age-old
mercantilistic practice that came to the American colonies in the form of
British Navigation Acts,”22 which “date back to the 1600’s” when they
protected British trading interests against foreign competitors like the
Dutch.23 Recognizing the importance of protecting a country’s shipping
industry at the inception of the U.S.’s creation, domestic shipping laws
were established “in the First Congress of 1789-1791.”24 This law, which
imposed the first maritime cabotage restriction, was actually a tax law
entitled “An Act Imposing Duties on Tonnage,” and enforced higher taxes
on foreign ships that “wished to engage in coastwise business, signaling
the early American interest in protecting their domestic, port-to-port
shipping trade from foreign competitors.”25 Taxes were relatively high for
foreign vessels under this law, as they were charged fifty cents per ton of
cargo, compared to a “U.S. built and owned vessel,” which was only
charged six cents per ton of cargo.26 But, this early tax law still lacked
ability to fully incentivize the use of “American built and owned ships and
vessels” because it “did not prohibit foreign ships from participating in
coastwise trades along the waters of the United States.”27 Thus, because
seafaring transport was the preeminent mode of travel and trade in the 18th
and 19th century,28 the newly-formed American government continued to
maintain emphasis on strengthening its U.S. maritime industry, seeking

21
See Lisa Houssiere, The Jones Act and export of crude oil and LNG from the USA,
NORTON ROSE
FULBRIGHT
¶
2
(Mar.
2016),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/137945/the-jones-act-and-export-ofcrude-oil-and-lng-from-the-usa (explaining that most countries place restrictions on their coastwise
trade).
22
Grennes, supra note 18, at 4.
23
Frittelli, supra note 6, at 2.
24
Grennes, supra note 18, at 4.
25
Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 613 (citing Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 27 (repealed
1790)).
26
Frittelli, supra note 6, at 2.
27
Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 614–15.
28
KENNETH D. FREDERICK & ROGER A. SEDJO, AMERICA’S RENEWABLE RESOURCES:
HISTORICAL TRENDS AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 28–30 (2011).
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stronger maritime cabotage laws that would force American industries to
use American-made and American-staffed ships.29
A. Original U.S. Maritime Cabotage Restrictions
These original maritime cabotage restrictions put in place by the
First Congress’s tax law were soon followed by “An Act concerning the
navigation of the United States” (the Navigation Act of 1817), which is
“regarded as the direct predecessor to the Jones Act.”30 This Act was the
first true maritime cabotage restriction in U.S. law, outright “barr[ing]
foreign vessels from domestic commerce,” and completely banning them
from any coastal trade between U.S. ports.31 After imposing this complete
ban on foreign competitors in port-to-port trade, the American maritime
shipping industry grew significantly and eventually “dominate[d]
domestic shipping,” successfully ousting foreign competitors.32 But,
growth in domestic shipping was not because U.S. ships were superior in
quality; rather, success of the U.S.’s shipping industry was possible
because of the protectionist nature of the Navigation Act,33 as the Act
specifically required that any and all domestic trade done by maritime
transportation be on U.S.-flagged vessels.34 Moving into the 20th century,
even prior to the ultra-protectionist Jones Act, the U.S.’s policy on
domestic shipping was still considered to be “the most restrictive,
protectionist shipping policies in the world.”35
The U.S. maritime industry operated under the Navigation Act up
until and all the way though World War I (WWI), which brought to light
some of the inherent issues regarding the quality of the U.S. domestic
shipping fleet. Although the domestic coastal fleet had grown
substantially, it consisted almost entirely of outdated, wooden vessels.36
During WWI, steel had replaced wood as the primary shipbuilding
29
30

Id.
Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 98 (citing Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 31, § 4, 3 Stat.

351).
31
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MARITIME ADMINISTRATION POLICY PAPER ON U.S.
CABOTAGE LAWS, https://www.maritime.dot.gov/sites/marad.dot.gov/files/
docs/resources/newsroom/fact-sheets/3626/cabotagelaws.pdf ¶ 1–2 (last visited Jan. 24,
2017); see also Stephen Mihm, Editorial: Why the U.S. Embraced the Jones Act a Century Ago,
BLOOMBERG ¶ 8 (Oct. 16, 2017), http://gcaptain.com/why-the-us-embraced-the-jones-act-a-centuryago/.
32
See Mihm, supra note 31, at ¶ 13 (noting that “the American domination of domestic
shipping rested on protectionism, not any real competitive advantage.”).
33
See id. at ¶ 12.
34
RUSS KASHIAN, ET. AL., PERSPECTIVE: A SURVEY OF THE COSTS AND EFFECTS OF THE
1920 MERCHANT MARINE ACT 4 (eds. Keli’i Akina, Malia Blom Hill & Joe Kent, 2017).
35
Mihm, supra note 31, at ¶ 13.
36
Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 102; Mihm, supra note 31, at ¶ 14.
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material, but U.S. shipyards could not afford to use it because of the high
price and protectionist tariffs insulating the domestic steel industry (alas,
the U.S. loves its protectionist laws).37 Further, the U.S. fleet responsible
for international shipping was roughly “a tenth of the size” of that
responsible for domestic shipping and primarily dependent on foreignflagged ships.38 After the U.S.’s domestic shipping fleet was decimated in
aiding war efforts, the low-quality of their merchant marine was suddenly
revealed. Coastwise shipping became “prohibitively expensive” and
maritime shipping laws had to be relaxed in an attempt to restructure and
revitalize the shipping industry.39 Only then did the U.S. government
finally allow foreign vessels to participate in coastwise shipping to offset
costs and rebuild their domestic fleet. This included multiple policies,
including the Panama Act of 1912, the Shipping Act of 1916, and the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, which combined allowed the
government to acquire young (less than five years old), foreign-built ships
that were brought in to supplement the waning U.S. merchant marine
fleet.40
With the weaknesses of the U.S. domestic merchant marine
exposed by WWI, “the country realized that it needed to do more in order
to have the merchant marine available in case of war.”41 Thus, the Jones
Act was established with that purpose in mind,42 and with little debate in
its passage, the Act became “the cornerstone of any future American
maritime policy.”43 Although the Jones Act was essentially a
“continuation” of the aforementioned cabotage laws that had been
continually passed since the First Congress,44 the Jones Act still

37

See Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 615.
Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 102.
39
See Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 615–16.
40
The restrictions on each acquired foreign ship were dependent on which one of these
Acts it was acquired under. Id. at 616.
41
Id.
42
See 46 App. U.S.C. § 861 (explaining that the purpose of the Jones Act is to ensure that
a strong domestic merchant marine exists for national security interest’s promotion of growth in
international and domestic commerce).
43
Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 105 (further noting that because the final version
of the Jones Act was essentially the same in the House and the Senate at time of passage there is little
legislative history on it, so more key in the Act is “the statutory language itself”).
44
In an address to Congress regarding a proposed amendment to repeal the Jones Act with
the passage of a bill to approve the Keystone XL Pipeline Act, Senator McCain stated: “As many of
you know, the Jones Act is simply a continuation of laws passed through U.S. history addressing
cabotage-or port-to-port coastal shipping. Those laws have been used to protect U.S. domestic
shipping dating back to the very first session of Congress.” 161 Cong. Rec. S372-02 (Statement of
Sen. McCain).
38
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“represents some of the most restrictive cabotage policies among
industrialized nations and in the world.”45
Since its passage, the Jones Act has required that to participate in
U.S. coastwise transport (of merchandise), a vessel:
may not provide any part of the transportation of merchandise by
water, or by land and water, between points in the United States to which
the coastwise laws apply, either directly or via a foreign port, unless the
vessel—(1) is wholly owned by citizens of the United
States
for
purposes of engaging in the coastwise trade; and (2) has been issued a
certificate of documentation with a coastwise endorsement . . . or is exempt
from documentation but would otherwise but would otherwise be eligible
for such a certificate and endorsement.46
Although this language is already extremely restrictive of foreign
competition, the especially stringent requirements of the Jones Act are
exposed by looking at the details of its statutory language. For example,
“coastwise” regulations include all U.S. territories and possessions, which
includes Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.47 This alone has created a plethora of issues regarding distribution
of costs imposed by the Act, which are discussed in detail in Parts III and
IV.48 Further, obtaining a “coastwise endorsement” includes a
controversial “U.S.-build requirement,” which “requires that [a] vessel
[involved in domestic trade] be built in the United States except in certain
circumstances.”49 This build requirement is one-of-a-kind for cabotage
laws, as it is not seen in any other modes of U.S. transportation, thus
highlighting the extensive protectionism that the Jones Act promotes.50
B. Post-Passage History of the Jones Act
Since its passage the Jones Act has only become more
restrictive.51 Notably, after an amendment to the Jones Act in 1956, any
ship that is now “rebuilt” outside the United States, even if originally built
within it, will no longer have the right to engage in domestic coastwise
45

KASHIAN, supra note 34, at 5.
46 U.S.C. § 55102(b) (2012).
47
Id. § 55101(a) (noting that “the coastwise laws apply to the United States, including the
island territories and possessions of the United States.”).
48
See infra Part III, Part IV.
49
46 U.S.C. § 55102 (2012) (Historical and Revision Notes); see also Joseph M. Conley,
The Jones Act: Its Effects on the U.S. Response to the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and its
Relevance in International Law, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. R. 151, 154 (2012).
50
See Conley, supra note 49, at 154 (citing Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 122);
see also Frittelli, supra note 6, at 2 (stating that “[a]ir cabotage laws [have certain restrictions] . . . but
there is no requirement that the planes be built in the [U.S.]”).
51
See Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 106.
46

72 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XII:I
trade.52 Additionally, other legislation and policy matters that have come
after the Jones Act have felts its influence, as its widespread restrictions in
the vital market of maritime shipping are intertwined with other methods
of transportation.53
The first piece of legislation worth noting is the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA), which extended U.S. lands to “all
artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or
temporarily attached to the seabed.”54 Since this act’s passage, the Jones
Act now applies to “artificial islands, mobile oil drilling rigs, . . . drilling
platforms” and the like.55 Thus, after the passage of the OCSLA, only
Jones Act compliant ships would be able to transport natural resources
produced from an offshore rig if the resources were being returned to a
domestic refinery, because the natural resources produced are considered
“merchandise” under the current meaning of the Act.56
Just as the Jones Act’s influence on the OCSLA affects cabotage
and transportation in the U.S. energy market, more “petroleum-related
cabotage laws were passed in the 1970s” because of the Jones Act.57 The
first law was the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, which
required that “any exports of [Alaskan] crude oil must be on [Jones Act
compliant] U.S.-flag tankers.”58 Because of the Jones Act, Alaskan oil had
to be shipped pursuant to its stringent requirements, and could not be
exported by cheaper and more convenient foreign vessels.59 Additionally,
the Competitive Shipping and Shipbuilding Act of 1983 attempted to
impose a requirement that “[five] percent of imports and exports [of oil] .
. . be carried by U.S. built and registered vessels.”60 Although this bill
eventually failed, it represents the concerted effort by Jones Act
proponents to extend its restrictions into other domestic cabotage laws.
Despite how far reaching and influential the Jones Act had
become, it remained relatively un-scrutinized until after World War II, as
proponents and opponents began to take a harder look at the law’s effects
on the overall economy.61 The resulting studies on the Jones Act
52

P.L. 714, Act of July 14, 1956, ch. 600, 70 Stat. 544.
Id.
54
See Oyedemi, supra note 7, at 619 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2016)).
55
Id.
56
Id.; 46 U.S.C. § 55102(b) (2012).
57
Robert Bradley, Jr., Cabotage Cronyism: Some History of the Jones Act,
MASTERRESOURCE.ORG ¶ 9 (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.masterresource.org/
jones-act-maritime-regulation/history-jones-act/.
58
H.R. Rep. No. 104–139, pt. 1, at 19; see also Bradley, supra note 57, at ¶ 10.
59
See Bradley, supra note 57.
60
Id. at ¶ 10 n.9.
61
See Papavizas & Gardner, supra note 5, at 108.
53
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subsequently revealed just how restrictive and protective the law truly was.
The Act’s influence was not only prevalent in domestic maritime
transportation but it had subtly permeated into other domestic cabotage
transportation laws.

II.

CURRENT STATE OF THE JONES ACT

Due to the Jones Act’s heavily protectionist scheme, different
groups and people have historically been affected in varying ways and
degrees. When the Jones Act was passed in 1920, the U.S. had just come
out of WWI, with national security interests still on the forefront of
everyone’s mind and maritime shipping still the primary and most broadly
used method of transportation for both people and merchandise.62 But,
over the past century, new methods of transportation and changing
industry processes have vastly shifted the economic landscape. Despite
these changes, the Jones Act has remained stagnant, which has
undoubtedly played a significant role in influencing the development of
other methods of transportation.63 But, whether the role the Jones Act had
on domestic cabotage laws and transportation has been beneficial or
detrimental is heavily disputed because “some producers suffer, while
their rivals benefit.”64
This Part will explore what the actual ramifications of the Jones
Act have been on the present-day economy, especially in relation to the
Act’s intended purposes and the energy transportation market. It will first
consider whether the Jones Act, in its current state, accomplishes its
intended purpose and what the overall economic impact has been,
considering both the benefits and the negatives alleged by proponents and
opponents of the Act. The analysis will then turn to how the Jones Act has
affected the U.S. energy market, primarily analyzing how it influences
domestic “intermodal”65 competition within energy transport. Lastly, it
will turn to past and ongoing legislative and administrative actions related
to the Jones Act, looking at the multitude of efforts that have attempted to

62
See Grennes, supra note 18, at 10. But see Frederick & Sedjo, supra note 28, at 28–30
(explaining that water transportation went into decline in 1840, but the author is referring to “inland”
water routes as opposed to domestic shipping coastally and internationally).
63
Nancy Ruth Fox & Lawrence J. White, U.S. Ocean Shipping Policy: Going Against the
Tide, 553 ANNALS. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 75, 83–85 (1997). This author aptly notes that “[t]he
Jones Act protection of coastal trades, with its consequence of higher shipping rates, has surely caused
some goods to be shipped over less efficient modes or not to be shipped at all.” Id. at 83.
64
Id.
65
Intermodal transportation pertains to “transportation involving more than one form of
carrier.” Intermodal Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/intermodal
(last visited Jan. 25, 2018).
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change its strict protectionist requirements in order to open up (or, in some
instances, further shelter off) the domestic marketplace.
A. The Jones Act’s Mixed Results in Accomplishing its
Economic Purpose
How and to what degree the Jones Act has impacted the U.S.
economy has been the subject of heavy dispute,66 as the multiple economic
reports on the subject have come over a lengthy time span. Admittedly,
pinpointing exact figures and numbers that can be directly linked back to
the Jones Act is a difficult task, especially because gathering reference
points in the short periods when the Jones Act has not been in effect in the
last century (i.e., when Jones Act waivers have been in effect) provides
only a limited view into the broad ranging influence it actually retains.67
Additionally, Jones Act opponents allege that it has had a more significant
impact on places outside the contiguous United States (e.g., Hawaii,
Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Guam) because of the additional maritime travel
that is required to serve those markets and “since a much greater
proportion of their goods are supplied via ship.”68 Thus, more of the
research available on the economic impact of the Jones Act revolves
around these states and territories, which explains why Jones Act scholars
typically do not take a more holistic approach that considers the United
States in its entirety. Nonetheless, all Jones Act critics (both supporters
and opponents) seem to recognize that the protectionist policy is having a
substantial economic effect in some form or fashion.69
1. The Jones Act’s Successes

66
Elizabeth Chuck, What is the Jones Act? Opponents to 1920 Law Argue it’s Worsening
Puerto Rico’s Crisis, NBC NEWS ¶ 5–7 (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/puerto-rico-crisis/what-jones-act-opponents-1920-law-argue-it-s-worseningn805101 (identifying both the supporters and opposition to the Act). But see The Jones Act is Critical
to the Military Strategy of the United States, Which Relies on the Use of U.S. Flag Ships, AM. MAR.
PARTNERSHIP, https://www.americanmaritimepartnership.com/u-s-maritime-industry/the-jones-act/,
¶ 1–5 (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) (arguing that the Jones Act “is crucial to our country’s economic
security”).
67
See Mark Gius, Regulatory restrictions and energy: The impact of the Jones Act on spot
gasoline prices, 62 ENERGY POL’Y 1058, 1059 (2013) (analyzing the spot gasoline prices during Jones
Act waiver periods of the last ten years, which “have all been for petroleum and petroleum-based
products”).
68
KASHIAN, supra note 34, at 5 (explaining that the importing and exporting of
“merchandise” via maritime transportation is more prevalent here because, in most instances, it is the
only method of transportation these territories have available).
69
See supra note 63.
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Turning first to those who support the Jones Act, the proponents
of the Act continually argue that it has been a resounding success and
accomplishes its original goals.70 Specifically, they argue that the Jones
Act allows the U.S. to maintain a strong domestic merchant marine that
can quickly respond to any “national emergency” (e.g., wartime or natural
disaster), and has boosted domestic commerce by establishing and
protecting an American shipping industry by insulating it from foreign
intervention.71 The Jones Act proponents who have proffered these
arguments primarily consist of (1) pro-defense groups; (2) maritime
unions; and (3) U.S. shipyards.72 Collectively, they contend that the Jones
Act is essential to national defense efforts, job creation, and the U.S.
shipbuilding industry.73
In terms of “national emergency,” the ideology of Jones Act
supporters can be attributed back to “Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 1890 work
on naval warfare, The Influence of Sea Power upon History.”74 Here,
Mahan stressed that a strong merchant marine was the key to ensuring a
strong navy and national defense.75 Jones Act proponents have mostly
stuck by this mantra, entrenched in their position that the current law is
“vital to the national security.”76 To counter the opposition’s argument that
the U.S. has never actually engaged its Jones Act compliant fleet in a
national emergency, proponents note that what the Jones Act provides is
the “ability to meet any [national emergency]” with a strong domestic fleet
at the ready.77
Less staunch supporters also retain the position that the Jones Act
currently serves national security interests, but concede that in recent
history, there is evidence the Act has not been the most proficient in this
70
See Samuel A. Giberga & John Henry Tab Thompson, We and Mr. Jones: How the
Misunderstood Jones Act Enhances Our Security and Economy, 46 J. MAR. L. & COM., no. 4, 2015,
at 493, 502–08. It is worth noting that other Jones Act scholars find that “the Jones Act has attracted
few public defenses,” and when one does surface, it is usually authored by individuals that directly
benefit from the it. See Coleman, supra note 4, at 6. For example, Samuel A. Giberga, the author of
the above article, is “the executive office of ‘Hornbeck Offshore Services, Inc.,’ [which is] the owner
and operator of one of the largest fleets of Jones Act qualified offshore service vessels.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
71
Giberga & Thompson, supra note 70, at 502, 505.
72
Frittelli, supra note 6, at 5–6; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73
See Frittelli, supra note 6, at 5–6.
74
Malia Blom Hill, The Sinking Ship of Cabotage: How the Jones Act lets unions and a
few companies hold the economy hostage, CAP. RES. CTR. 1, 2 (Apr. 7, 2013),
https://capitalresearch.org/article/the-sinking-ship-of-cabotage-how-the-jones-act-lets-unions-and-afew-companies-hold-the-economy-hostage/ (noting that “Jones used Mahan’s writings on national
defense . . . to justify creating [the Jones Act]”).
75
Id.
76
Frittelli, supra note 6, at 5.
77
See Giberga & Thompson, supra note 70, at 504 (emphasis added); see also Chuck,
supra note 60, at ¶ 6 (explaining that the Jones Act has received bi-partisan support from past U.S.
presidents, who “have touted it as crucial to national security because it reduces America’s dependency
on foreign-owned vessels”).
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area.78 Supportive congressional research sums up the Act’s deficiency in
this area to changing dynamics of war, stating that because of “the long
time needed to build new ships, the relatively brief duration of most recent
wars, and the expanded inventory of government-owned sealift ships, the
wartime importance of the shipbuilding industry has declined.”79
Proponents further contend that the Jones Act’s national security purpose
remains intact because in the event of a prolonged national emergency, the
merchant marine developed by the Act still has the ability to provide
government ships with reinforcements.80 Although this hypothetical
argument works on paper, the reality is that the Jones Act fleet is
comprised of commercial vessels, not multi-purpose ones, and these
vessels lack much of the capabilities that would be necessary to offer
strategic military support.81 Further, the commercial Jones Act fleet has
diminished over time, and now contains only about ninety ships.82 More
national security concerns will be discussed below, but it remains
relatively clear that the current state of the Jones Act struggles to continue
serving this purpose.
The stronger point that proponents make in arguing that the Act
has historically benefitted the U.S. economy rests in the Act’s second
stated purpose—that it boosts domestic commerce83—as it is undeniable
that the Act has created jobs and continues to stand as the backbone to the
domestic shipping industry.84 Pursuant to the Act’s basic requirements,
Jones Act vessels must be built in U.S. shipyards, crewed by U.S. citizens,
and used for all coastwise transport.85 American jobs are created at each
stage of this process, as they must be, or else there would be no way to

78
Most recently, the Jones Act had to be waived to assist in the wake of Hurricane Maria
(as it has been for most natural disasters). See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text. To provide
a war time example, “more than one-fifth of dry cargo” deployed to the military during the Persian
Gulf conflict was done so using foreign-chartered vessels as opposed to the domestic merchant marine.
Nicolas Loris, Brian Slattery, & Bryan Riley, Sink the Jones Act: Restoring America’s Competitive
Advantage in Maritime-Related Industries, HERITAGE FOUND. 1, 1 (May 22, 2014),
https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/sink-the-jones-act-restoring-americascompetitive-advantage-maritime.
79
Frittelli, supra note 6 at 3.
80
Id.
81
See Grennes, supra note 18, at 32 (stating “[t]he number of large Jones Act commercial
ships was 193 in 2000, but by 2014 there were only 90”).
82
See Coleman, supra note 4, at 6.
83
See 46 App. U.S.C. § 861 (2002).
84
See Chris Schultz, The Jones Act: Outdated or Vital?, LAW STREET ¶ 3 (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/politics/jones-act-outdated-vital/. See also Chuck, supra note 60, at
¶ 6 (stating “the law has found backers in the American maritime industry, which says it supports
American jobs”).
85
Frittelli, supra note 6.
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comply with the Act’s strict provisions.86 Proponents further argue that
“the economic contribution of the Jones Act extends [even] beyond ship
operations,” as the Jones Act further requires that U.S. ships are built with
U.S. products, which then creates additional jobs in the industries that
supply the shipbuilding materials.87
Whether the Jones Act creates jobs is not in dispute, and
opponents of the Act recognize that “Jones Act proponents . . . regularly
claim[] that job creation is a major benefit of the [A]ct.”88 Jones Act
opponents instead consider the price that we pay to create these jobs. As
later analysis will discuss, the Jones Act is “poorly tailored” to meet its
job creation goals.89 The lack of foreign investment makes the Act’s
shortcomings and inefficiencies in job creation especially acute, as the
only thing U.S. shipyards are still hired to construct are Jones Act
compliant ships (because the law requires that these shipyards are used).90
When further considering that U.S. built ships are rarely ever utilized for
anything besides U.S. port-to-port travel, justification of the Act’s
economic viability becomes a progressively more onerous task.
2. The Jones Act’s Failures
Directly contradicting the arguments of the proponents, detractors
of the Jones Act argue that the law, in its current state, “hinders free trade,
stifles the economy, and hurts consumers, largely for the benefit of labor
unions.”91 This statement, made by Arizona Senator John McCain in his
previous effort to repeal the Jones Act, has been echoed by other studies
conducted on the economic effects of the Jones Act, one of which states:
Economic evidence abounds that the Jones Act harms business
and the U.S. economy. Nearly every independent study of the act’s effects
finds it creates expensive barriers to trade. In 1995, a report from the U.S.
International Trade Commission, an independent agency, found the Jones
Act costs the U.S. economy at least $2.8 billion annually and its removal
would lower domestic shipping prices by 26% . . . [and] a 2013 report . . .
describe[s] the Jones Act as the most restrictive of global cabotage laws
and an anomaly in an otherwise open market like the United States.92

86
See The Jones Act, TRANSP. INST., https://transportationinstitute.org/jones-act/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2018).
87
Id.
88
Grennes, supra note 18, at 38.
89
Coleman, supra note 4, at 6.
90
See id.
91
161 CONG. REC. S372-02 (statement of Sen. McCain), supra note 44.
92
Hill, supra note 74, at 2–3 (internal quotations omitted).
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In addition to the adverse economic effects, opponents routinely
raise arguments that the Jones Act is an outdated law that does not, and
has never, served its intended purpose.93 Although most economic studies
on the Jones Act note that its costs are dispersed to almost all of American
consumers, the Act’s most prominent opponents have historically been (1)
bulk shippers; and (2) consumers in the non-contiguous U.S. territories
and states.94
Again considering “national emergency,” as was briefly discussed
above,95 Jones Act opponents argue that despite the Jones Act’s stated
purpose, the idea of contributing to military efforts with a domestic
merchant marine ignores the realities of actual modern-day maritime
operations.96 It is argued that even if the U.S. wanted to send its merchant
marine to contribute to U.S. military efforts abroad, it would not be able
to because of the significantly diminished Jones Act compliant fleet
capacity.97 Outside of the Jones Act commercial vessels, the rest of the
fleet is apparently made up of “ferries and tugboats, which would
contribute little to distant military actions.”98 Further, there have been cited
instances where military efforts succeed in spite of, rather than because of,
the Jones Act, which again required waivers to be granted so that foreign
ships could assist.99 Similarly, as previously mentioned, the Jones Act is
meant to extend to all “national emergencies,” which include both “natural
and human-induced [natural] disasters, such as hurricanes, floods, oil
spills, loss of electrical power, and breaks in oil pipelines.”100 Most
recently, for Hurricanes Harvey and Maria, Jones Act waivers had to be
granted (which has become standard practice).101 Rather than offer any
assistance, the Act rather served to create “unnecessary legal roadblocks”
when waiver was delayed or refused during these disasters.102 Thus,
although general “national emergency” assistance was one of the Jones
Act’s intended purposes, sparse evidence exists to justify keeping the
Jones Act in its current state to actually assist in these situations, as it
seems to create more trouble than it helps to alleviate.
93
See, e.g., Slattery et al., supra note 78, at 1–7 (analyzing in-depth why the Jones Act
hinders national security and is harmful to the U.S. economy).
94
Frittelli, supra note 6, at 4–5.
95
See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
96
Slattery et al., supra note 78, at 1–2
97
See Grennes, supra note 18, at 32 (noting that the Jones Act commercial fleet has fallen
from 193 ships in 2000 to just 90 in 2014).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 32.
100
Id. at 34.
101
Id.
102
Slattery et al., supra note 78, at 4.
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Turning to economic benefits of the Act, opponents offer statistics
that stand in stark contrast to those on which proponents depend,
summarily arguing that any positives the Act may bring are far outweighed
by its negatives. Although originally intended to bolster domestic
commerce, the Jones Act in today’s environment acts more like a crutch
by “keep[ing] otherwise uncompetitive elements of the American shipping
industry afloat . . . [at] a stiff price [to] consumers.”103 The Jones Act,
recognized as an “unabashedly protectionist” piece of legislation by the
judiciary,104 specifically acts as a crutch to the U.S. shipping industry,
because it has been shielded from having to respond to competition for
over a century and thus has not had motivation to innovate.105
Consequently, U.S. shipping has become uncompetitive, as U.S.-flag
bearing ships now account for only 0.4% of the worlds fleet.106
Although the definitive net cost is disputed, some numbers given
by opponents provide evidence that the Jones Act has hindered our
domestic shipping industry to a point where it may cease to exist if the
Jones Act were repealed, as the extreme costs imposed by the law would
dissuade anyone from investing in a U.S. ship if the law did not require
them to. Multiple studies have found that having a ship built or produced
in the U.S. costs “four to five times higher” than what it would cost to
build a ship abroad.107 In addition to increased building costs, the
“Congressional Research Service has shown that operating costs of
American vessels bound to the Jones Act can be more than twice as high
per day to comparable foreign ships.”108 Further, opponents are uniform
in their agreement that “in far-flung domestic ports like Hawaii, Alaska,
and Puerto Rico . . . the problem [of the Jones Act] is particularly
salient.”109 The Jones Act has been cited directly as a major factor in
103
Id. at 1; see Grennes, supra note 18, at 6 (stating that “[n]early all analytical studies of
the Jones Act have found that it imposes net costs on the U.S. economy).
104
Marine Carriers Corp. v. Fowler, 429 F.2d 702, 708 (2d Cir. 1970).
105
See J.W. Wall III, Wall: Want to Help Texas? Repeal the Jones Act, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE (February 20, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/
outlook/article/Wall-Want-to-help-Texas-Repeal-the-Jones-Act-12628472.php; see also
Grennes, supra note 18, at 10.
106
Id. at 11; see also How Protectionism Sank America’s Entire Merchant Fleet,
ECONOMIST ¶ 1 (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21730034jones-act-hurts-american-consumers-and-destroyed-countrys-shipping.
107
Stevens, supra note 19, at 3, ¶ 5; Grennes, supra note 18, at 21; KASHIAN, supra note
34, at 14; John Frittelli, Shipping U.S. Crude Oil by Water: Vessel Flag Requirements and Safety
Issues,
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE,
1,
11
(July
21,
2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43653.pdf.
108
Stevens, supra note 19, at ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
109
Coleman, supra note 4, at 5. Even Jones Act opponents cannot ignore the adverse costs
that these regions feel because of their distance and lack of transportation options, stating that “[these
areas] have a relationship with the Jones Act that differs from the continental United States . . . [and]
have every right to be unhappy with higher prices” that the Act causes. Giberga & Thompson, supra
note 70, at 507–08.
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Puerto Rico’s economic woes,110 and various studies have estimated the
Act’s combined costs in these areas to range between $2.8 billion to $9.8
billion per year.111
It seems that the primary point that opponents of the Act hope to
make is that, although the Jones Act does create jobs and keeps the U.S.
shipping industry afloat, its costs undoubtedly exceed the benefits that it
offers. It is indisputable that the Jones Act was not passed or put in place
to be a “jobs program” that continues to employ “regardless of how little
[employees] produce or what the ships cost,” and it should thus not be
justifiable to continue under this purpose.112 Keeping it alive for this
purpose has not only impeded the U.S. economy in terms of maritime
transportation, but it has also begun to strangle other parts of the U.S.
economy, significantly affecting areas that depend on fairly priced,
reliable transport.113 At the forefront of this is the U.S. energy market, as
the Jones Act has distorted energy transportation and taken away domestic
business.114
B. The Jones Act Effect’s on the U.S. Energy Market
As a protectionist domestic transportation law, the Jones Act has
had its biggest influence (outside of maritime shipping) in the energy
transportation market, which has become significantly more complex
since the Jones Act’s passage.115 Because of the “[broad] scope of the
[domestic energy market’s] supply chain,” the Jones Act’s influence on
cabotage laws within energy have been amplified, and has ultimately
influenced everything in domestic energy from production of natural
resources to how those resources are imported and exported.116 Illustrating
the depth of the relationship between the two industries, petroleum
products accounted for, and continue to account for, the “lion’s share” of

110
Editorial, Puerto Rico Needs Debt Relief, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/opinion/puerto-rico-needs-debt-relief.html?_r=0
(directly
offering relaxation of the Jones Act by lawmakers as a way to pull Puerto Rico out of debt).
111
See Opinion, Nelson Denis, The Jones Act: The Law Strangling Puerto Rico, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/opinion/
hurricane-puerto-rico-jones-act.html; see also Coleman, supra note 4, at 5 (estimating
combined savings to be “as much as $15 billion per year.”).
112
Grennes, supra note 18, at 38.
113
See Puerto Rico Needs Debt Relief, supra note 110.
114
See Wall, supra note 105.
115
See id.
116
Stevens, supra note 19, at ¶ 7; see also Bradley, supra note 57 (exemplifying a time
when the Jones Act had a direct effect on the cabotage laws of natural gas).
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Jones Act cargos.117 But, as transportation options have expanded, the
energy industry has rallied against maritime shipping due to the
prohibitively expensive price tag the Act carries, which has made it
extraordinarily difficult for the energy industry to utilize maritime
transportation.118 As a result, “intermodal competition”119 expanded
throughout the domestic energy market, and other forms of transportation
began to burgeon, which finally led to the substitution of shipping and
maritime transport for more economical methods of transportation.120
Today, these newer methods of transportation, which include “trucks,
railroads, airlines, and pipelines,” have become an integral part of the
domestic natural resource supply chain due to costs of the Jones Act.121
As an example of the Jones Act’s excessive costs, research
assessing the domestic premium on natural resource shipments found that
“shipping oil from Texas to New England costs about $6 per barrel, while
shipping to Europe costs just $2 per barrel,”122 resulting in total costs of
“more than $158 million every year” for the petroleum industry.123 Thus,
as alternative forms of transportation have become available, natural
resource producers have jumped on the opportunity to utilize them in an
effort to save both themselves and consumers from facing the adverse
impact and significant price hikes of the Jones Act. But, despite the
increasingly popular alternative forms of transportation, the Jones Act
could not be fully ignored by the energy industry for long.
The first issues were realized in assessing the energy markets for
the non-contiguous U.S. states and territories,124 as it quickly became
apparent that without the option to utilize these new methods of natural
resource transport, U.S. states and territories separated by ocean would
have to continue to rely on the “maritime energy commerce” that the fortyeight contiguous U.S. states had the luxury of avoiding.125 Because the
U.S. has refused to change or amend the Jones Act for its non-contiguous

117
Giberga & Thompson, supra note 70, at 504; see also JOHN FRITTELLI, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., REVITALIZING COASTAL SHIPPING FOR DOMESTIC COMMERCE 1, 2 (May 2, 2017),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44831.pdf (noting that “oceangoing barges [in the U.S.] mainly carry
petroleum products.”).
118
Id.
119
See supra note 63.
120
Grennes, supra note 18, at 19–20.
121
See id.
122
KASHIAN, supra note 34, at 13; Wall, supra note 105 (stating that “[t]o ship Texas crude
to Europe or Asia, it’s only $2 per barrel; [but] it costs $7 per barrel to ship to Philadelphia.”).
123
Keli’i Akina, How the Jones Act Drives up the Price of Food and Gasoline for Millions
of Americans, THE HILL (Apr. 10, 2017, 7:20 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/international/328025-how-the-jones-act-drives-up-the-cost-of-food-and-gasoline.
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KASHIAN, ET. AL., supra note 34.
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Loris, Slattery, & Riley, supra note 78, at 8–9.
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states and territories, it has created a distortion in energy markets that “has
a larger negative effect on [these] noncontiguous states and regions.”126
A second, more recent issue in the modern energy market arose
with the “shale revolution,”127 which has made the United States one of
the biggest producers of domestic crude oil in the world since 1995.128 The
shale revolution, made possible by “[d]irectional drilling and hydraulic
fracturing” (or “fracking”), has “transformed oil markets by dramatically
increasing U.S. production of oil and gas from shale.”129 But, the U.S.’s
sudden increase in domestically produced oil has also reinvigorated the
need to invoke maritime shipping because “the existing pipeline network
is not designed to access the new sources of domestic crude.”130 Due to the
lack of accessible transportation because of the Jones Act making it
prohibitively expensive to ship within the U.S, the producers seeking to
capitalize on this shale boom have been unable to capitalize in the
domestic energy market.131 Instead, both producers and refineries have
turned to foreign markets.132 This makes the ineffectiveness of the law
blatant because preventing these “absurd situations,” like the current one
the energy industry finds themselves in (where it is cheaper to refine crude
oil abroad than in the U.S.) is exactly what the protectionist Jones Act was
created to do.133 As a protectionist law that no longer protects domestic
commerce, it is now time to relax or repeal the Jones Act so that growth
in the domestic energy market can be promoted rather than prevented.
III.

THE JONES ACT’S DAMAGE TO DOMESTIC ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT

Just as the Jones Act has not served its intended purpose in
domestic shipping, it has also adversely affected cabotage laws in other
industries, therefore, not serving its broader purpose in promoting and
protecting domestic commerce. Because the antiquated Jones Act has
126

Grennes, supra note 18, at 19; Loris, Slattery, & Riley, supra note 78, at 1–2.
Grennes, supra note 18, at 29 (explaining that “the shale revolution has reduced US
crude oil imports and increased the importance of domestic trade that is subject to the Jones Act.”);
see Coleman, supra note 4, at 3.
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Loris, Slattery, & Riley, supra note 78, at 8–9.
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See Grennes, supra note 18, at 19–20.
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Id.
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HILL, supra note 74, at 3 (providing another example of an “absurd situation” that the
Jones Act forced, involving a lumber supplier being forced to truck wood from Maine to Florida in
order to get it to Puerto Rico because, Maine had no Jones Act compliant ships available to ship the
wood).
127
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outlived the purpose it was originally intended to serve, its lasting
protectionism has begun to seep into additional U.S. policy hurting both
consumers and other industries vital to the success of the country.134

A. The Domestic Energy Market Continues to Suffer at the
Hands of the Jones Act
The Jones Act has inadvertently hindered the growth of the
domestic energy market.135 For example, it has imposed major costs on the
energy industry,136 which in turn has been passed on to consumers. Senator
McCain recognized as much in a recent effort to repeal the Jones Act via
an amendment to Keystone XL Pipeline Act,137 stating:
There is no doubt that these inflated costs [in domestic maritime
shipping] are eventually passed on to shipping customers. In the energy
sector, for example, the price for moving crude oil from the gulf coast
[where it is produced] to the Northeastern United States [to refine the oil]
on Jones Act tankers is $5 to $6 more per barrel, while moving it to eastern
Canada on foreign flag tankers is about $2 . . . [which could] mean an
additional $1 million per tanker in shipping costs for oil producers. This
increased cost is why . . . more than twice as much gulf coast crude oil was
shipped by water to Canada as shipped to Northeastern U.S. refineries . . .
in an effort to avoid paying Jones Act shipping rates.138
This statement makes blatantly clear the adverse effect the Jones
Act has had, not only on the domestic energy market, but on all U.S.
industries that have an invariable dependence on transport in moving their
merchandise.
Continuing to allow the Jones Act to have these absurd effects on
energy transportation is directly contrary to the policy the Trump
administration set forth this past March. In an Executive Order entitled
“Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth,” the President
and the executive branch clearly stated that any and all existing regulations
and policies “that potentially burden the development or use of
134
The Jones Act Has Outlived Its Reason for Existing, AM. J. OF TRANSP. ¶ 11 (Dec. 14,
2017),
https://www.ajot.com/news/the-jones-act-has-outlived-its-reason-for-existing-editorial
(arguing “[r]arely has a law that costs so much and achieves so little survived [for] so long”).
135
See Mark J. Perry, U.S. Energy Boom Depends on Team Trump Continuing to
Deregulate, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY ¶ 1–5 (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.investors.com/
politics/commentary/u-s-energy-boom-depends-on-team-trump-continuing-toderegulate/.
136
See Stevens, supra note 19, at ¶ 6–7.
137
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138
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domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil,
natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources” shall be reviewed in
detail.139 The Jones Act is preventing the U.S. from fully taking advantage
of the shale boom taking place domestically,140 and, therefore, is hindering
domestic energy independence and economic growth, which is directly
contrary to the Administration’s publicly stated policy.141
The Jones Act continues to hinder the energy market in the exact
way Senator McCain describes,142 preventing transport from the gulf
coast, where the oil is produced, to the northeast, where the oil can be
refined.143 Despite the northeast having a fully capable crude oil refinery—
in need of the oil being produced domestically144—the Jones Act
effectively prevents unrefined petroleum products from getting there on a
domestic port-to-port route.145 This directly causes a hindrance to growth
in the U.S. energy market in multiple ways, which illustrates how
significant and influential the Jones Act is in the transportation of natural
resources as a whole.
1. Costs Imposed by the Jones Act Discriminate Against Domestic
Maritime Transport of Crude Oil to U.S. Refineries
First and foremost, the prohibitive cost of the Jones Act itself has
become a barrier to the efficient transport of shale oil, especially if
shipping domestically from the south of the U.S. (i.e., Texas) to the east
coast of the U.S. (i.e., Massachusetts and Pennsylvania).146 It is estimated
that “it now costs three times as much to ship oil from Texas to refineries
on the U.S. East Coast as it costs to ship oil [from Texas to] Canada.”147
This significantly higher price point is a direct result of the stringent
requirements of the Jones Act, which has led to a smaller fleet of Jones
139
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Act compliant ships that cost significantly more to build and operate.148
As a result, both northeastern refineries and Texas producers turn to
foreign markets.149 The inherent absurdity illustrated here (i.e., domestic
shipping costing three times more than international shipping) presents an
egregious example of how the Jones Act directly discriminates against the
domestic energy market.
2. The Jones Act has Corrupted U.S. Energy Transportation
The first way the Jones Act impacts domestic energy directly
effects the second, as its prohibitively expensive domestic shipping prices
caused a destructive chain reaction to energy transportation as a whole.
Due to the high prices imposed by the Jones Act, producers have
historically sought out alternative ways to transport natural resources,
which has led to the growth of other methods of transportation (such as
transport by rail, truck, air, or most prominently in the U.S., pipeline).150
But transportation is all interrelated, and because the Jones Act almost
completely cuts off the economical use of maritime transportation, these
other methods have become overburdened and overused.151 The end result
has been a drastic increase in price to use these alternative methods,152 and
“concerns about transportation safety and potential impacts to the
environment.”153 The Jones Act’s restrictive measures on transport have
now “[had] a profound impact on where crude oil is sourced and how it is
transported.”154 The energy industry must not only comply with these
inflated prices to use transportation alternatives—costs that consumers
ultimately bear—but also utilize transport modes not typically suited to
moving more refined natural resources.155
Focusing on the alternative transportation forms that the Jones Act
adversely affected by making maritime transportation generally
unavailable for domestically shipping natural resources, the energy market
has turned to using pipelines and rail significantly more. Unfortunately,
with pipeline development, “the existing pipeline network is not designed
148
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to access the new source of domestic crude,” again making alternative
forms more expensive.156 Moreover, extensive use of pipelines over the
years has led to “strong opposition to the construction of new pipelines,”
further inhibiting the overall energy supply chain.157 Additionally, overuse
of rail shipments has caused strong opposition and increased pollution, an
abuse that has also furthered the importance (and price) of maritime
shipping, which the Act continually stands to prevent.158 Thus, the Jones
Act has corrupted and continues to corrupt the entire transportation pattern
of the U.S. energy trade.
3. The Jones Act’s Prevention of Domestic Transportation of LNG
Lastly, it is worth noting that the Jones Act can also be fully, not
just merely, preventative, as the outdated fleet of Jones Act-compliant
ships cannot transfer certain natural resources.159 The most prevalent
example, in relation to the non-contiguous U.S., is that no possible way
exists to transfer Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) domestically because
currently no Jones Act-compliant ship can carry or transport it.160 Even
more concerning is the general thought that no one could build an LNG
Jones Act compliant tanker under the current law because nothing could
rationalize its price since it would only run U.S. domestic routes.161
Considering LNG tankers cost billions to build, one used purely for
domestic routes would never be economical or competitive in the
international marketplace.162 Further, even if one could finance the tanker,
no U.S. ports currently have dock space available to support its
construction.163 This exemplifies the Jones Act’s restriction of
transportation without offering any viable solutions, aptly illustrating the
unchecked power the Act has on a key U.S. market.
Analyzing these issues ultimately shows a growing trend of the
Jones Act’s outdated maritime restrictions to play a significantly greater
role in the energy market’s development, adversely affecting the market’s
development as it grows while the restrictions remain stagnant.
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B. The Jones Act Imposes Major Costs that are Injurious to
Consumers
The costs the Jones Act imposes on the energy market are
eventually passed back to the consumer—another reason this Act
desperately needs re-evaluation. The Act’s defenders are historically wellorganized, as its alleged benefits concentrate into this small group of
supporters, while opponents’ losses reach the entire domestic
population.164 However, the Jones Act should not remain just to protect
this small group that the law actually benefits, while all consumers suffer,
especially those in the non-contiguous U.S.165
1. Inequitable Distribution of Jones Act Costs to the NonContiguous U.S.
Consumers in the non-contiguous areas of the U.S. predominantly
bear the immediate costs of the Jones Act, rather than the dispersed effect,
because they have no choice but to use maritime transport to import natural
resources.166 For example, because of the Jones Act, Puerto Rico “pays as
much as 30[%] more for [LNG than the contiguous U.S. states],” affecting
consumers’ electricity prices, while Hawaiians must pay significantly
more for oil, as “75[%] of its electricity [comes] from petroleum,” which
is all delivered by expensive Jones Act ships.167 Because Hawaii is “the
most petroleum-dependent state in the United States,”168 not only do the
Jones Act’s increased prices most significantly impact Hawaiian
consumers when importing resources,169 but also Hawaiian consumers
would reap the most significant benefits from relaxing the Act’s
requirements, as Hawaiians currently have “the highest cost of living and
the highest energy prices in the Union.”170 In Puerto Rico, researchers
estimated that gas prices “[are] inflated by at least 15 cents per gallon due
to the additional transportation costs.”171 As a result, the Jones Act costs
164
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Puerto Rico “approximately $537 million” in losses annually.172 The
federal government has even recognized how “detrimental” the Act is to
Puerto Rico, having formerly recommended that Puerto Rico be granted
“a temporary exemption . . . to alleviate the pressures from shipping costs
. . . .”173 Thus, especially in these areas, consumers must suffer an
inequitable share of the Jones Act’s costs. Yet, the government is still
reluctant to grant these areas waivers, despite its own findings that the law
remains especially injurious to consumers in these areas.174
2. A Collective Net Loss for the Average Consumer
Beyond these states and territories that front most of the costs, the
Jones Act significantly impacts the average consumer. Most prominently,
“[t]he U.S. International Trade Commission found that in 1996, the Jones
Act cost the U.S. economy an estimated $1.3 billion [and a] subsequent
study revealed . . . a $656 million annual positive welfare effect . . . if the
law were repealed.”175 Although dispersed, these are still significant
industry costs that are being passed to the consumers, and shedding them,
or lessening them even slightly, would be beneficial to all. These
substantial net losses to consumers simply do not outweigh the purported
benefits of the Jones Act, as additional studies have revealed that “for each
dollar gained by the protected parties [under the Jones Act], American
consumers of the transported products lose more than a dollar.”176 Thus,
this protectionism put in place by the Jones Act has been a “collective net
loss for Americans” in every respect (except the small domestic shipping
industry it was designed to protect), and the wider the act spreads across
other industries, the larger the losses become to consumers.177
In sum, the Jones Act’s overtly negative affect on the U.S.
economy represents how removed from its original purpose the law truly
is. In the following section, solutions are offered as to how the U.S. can
start to rectify the injuries that the Jones Act has caused to both consumers
and domestic commerce overall.
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THE JONES ACT SHOULD BE RELAXED IN PART
OR REPEALED IN FULL

Turning back to the larger focus of the Jones Act, outside of the
energy market specifically, the damages caused by the Jones Act could
begin to be rectified either by partial relaxation or full repeal. But,
considering how far removed it is from the purpose it was enacted to
accomplish, it is clear that the law needs some substantial changes to be
brought up to date with the modern economy. If the Jones Act is allowed
to remain as is, it is highly likely that other industries cabotage laws will
be adversely affected by its overly protectionist requirements, as the
energy market inadvertently was.
The U.S. should still retain some form of maritime cabotage laws,
as “there’s no faulting [the Act’s] professed goal.”178 The issue with the
Jones Act is purely the way it went about accomplishing its goals. America
is a historically open-market economy that invites competition to spur
innovation and investment in our marketplace. Thus, the Jones Act is out
of touch and out of place with our current laws. The key to reframing the
U.S. cabotage laws is to find a solution that protects U.S. shipping, but not
to the detriment of the industry, as the current maritime laws have done.179
There are a number of ways that this law could be re-worked to
remove some of its overtly protectionist measures, which would allow
foreign vessels to enter the marketplace without injuring the strength of
America’s own merchant marine fleet. First and foremost, it is crucial that
the non-contiguous states be allowed to employ foreign vessels to save on
costs when reasonable (especially in the energy market).180 This should be
the first priority because this is where the largest rift exists in which
consumers front the cost of the Jones Act.181
Another key change to the Jones Act, which would likely be the
easiest way to defray some of the immense costs it has created, would be
to rid the Act of its “U.S.-built” provision,182 as this is one of the more
controversial areas of the law, and unnecessarily unique to maritime
cabotage (meaning that no other form of transportation in the U.S. requires
that all of the materials must be American made).183 This provision is
already somewhat seen as an “exaggeration” of sorts, because it is difficult
178
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to track whether every piece of material used was made in America, and
what is actually important is that the ship is “American-built” as opposed
to having all American made parts.184
Short of full repeal, one final, non-controversial change to the
Jones Act could be the more lenient granting of waivers. Currently,
waivers are only granted either “in the ‘interest of national defense,’” or
sometimes if “no qualified U.S.-flagged vessels are available to meet the
need.”185 But, this standard is historically hard to meet. A simple solution
would be to begin granting waivers for economic hardship as opposed to
just national emergency. This could then be applied in a broader range of
situations, and could help to deal with ongoing situations that are not quite
at the national emergency level. Thus, waivers would become more
discretionary upon DHS’s judgment, and the Jones Act would
automatically be a more flexible law that could account for the everchanging economic marketplace of the U.S.
If all else fails, full repeal is still an option. Although Jones Act
repeal efforts have failed in the past because of staunch lobby oppositions
from the shipping industry,186 it does not mean they will necessarily fail
moving forward, especially with this new administration’s determination
to rid the government of unnecessary regulation. If the current Executive
were more closely following the plan set forth by their own Executive
Order,187 the Jones Act should have been one of the first pieces of
legislation to be targeted. As has been noted by opponents of the Jones
Act, if “the administration [pushed] to repeal the Jones Act—or, at the very
least . . . make it less restrictive” billions could collectively be saved on
shipping.188 This would then make other forms of transportation more
affordable, as transportation costs across the board would decrease in price
with more options available,189 and although dispersed, savings would
then be felt by consumers across the U.S. Thus, anything from repeal to
menial reform of the Jones Act would be in the best interest of the
government, domestic commerce, and consumers alike.
CONCLUSION
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Although the Jones Act was enacted to promote domestic
commerce, it is now nothing more than a crutch for the U.S. shipping
industry and a drain on the rest of the economy. Simply put, the Jones Act
has outlived its purpose, and as a century old law, it desperately needs to
be brought up to modern times. As one critic stated, “[t]he world is much
different than it was almost 100 years ago, when the Jones Act was passed
[and] [t]echnology, innovation and the speed of transportation have vastly
improved.”190 Yet, the Jones Act has never been adjusted to account for
these significant changes, and its protectionist measures have been
allowed to remain since its inception. As a result, its overly restrictive
provisions on domestic, port-to-port maritime transport have stretched into
other markets, affecting industries where transportation is a crucial part of
the supply chain.
Taking a critical look at the Jones Act, this article discussed how,
in particular, the Act strangles the energy market. It revealed that because
of the Jones Act, natural resource transportation has been pinched in a
multitude of areas, and because foreign competitors have been completely
banned from domestic shipping, competition has been stifled, causing U.S.
seafaring vessels to fall behind in both quantity and quality. Further, it
discussed how in some areas (like LNG), Jones Act compliant vessels do
not even exist, which has forced transportation through other, riskier
means. Or, in the instance of the non-contiguous U.S., forced states and
territories to turn to foreign markets, thus highlighting how the Act’s
discriminatory pressure on the energy market discriminates against growth
in domestic commerce. Finally, this article proposed that, outside of full
repeal, it would be beneficial to all parties involved to at least relax Jones
Act regulations in the energy market, which would help to promote the
current Executive trend towards deregulation and the growth of an
independent energy market.191
Without relaxation or repeal of the Jones Act, growth in the energy
market will remain stagnant, and our shipping industry will continue to
lag. Further, because the Jones Act continues to discourage foreign
investment, the Jones Act tankers becoming increasingly dated, less
reliable, and less available every day. Moreover, without some sort of
change in the law to account for a dynamic marketplace, prices to use
Jones Act ships will only increase, a cost which will be forced back on
unsuspecting consumers through energy prices.192 These expansive
detriments the Jones Act creates can no longer be ignored, and “as the U.S.
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emerges on the international energy market, inconsistent polices such as
the Jones Act should be reconsidered.”193
In order to prevent repercussions of the Jones Act from spreading
further or influencing other areas of domestic law in other parts of the
economy, it is imperative that the Jones Act be reevaluated in full, as
recommended above, to assess how it functions and affects the broader
scheme of domestic cabotage and transportation law. Outside of
continuing to review its economic impact, which has been studied in
significant detail,194 the pertinent next step is to thoroughly review the
Jones Act’s interplay with other areas of U.S. law. Understanding the full
extent of the Jones Act’s influence on domestic cabotage law and
transportation patterns would at least provide an opportunity for the
legislature to revisit the antiquated law with a hard look, which would
likely show that repeal or revision could provide the U.S. energy market
with a much needed “economic shot in the arm.”195
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